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Jim Skelton
Jim Skelton

Download Good Luck _VERIFIED_ Full Free

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This paper constitutes an essential component in any defense of libertarianism, which maintains that indeterminism is necessary for free will and moral responsibility. If the luck or Mind argument is sound, then rather than indeterminism being necessary for free will and moral responsibility, its absence will be required. This worry has led many to conclude that libertarianism is incoherent: libertarianism, it is argued, confuses a sufficient condition (indeterminism) for the absence of free will and moral responsibility with a necessary condition for their presence. Before libertarianism can be considered as serious contender for the best theory of free will and moral responsibility, it must be vindicated of this charge.

It is a general assumption of libertarianism that at least some free actions must be undetermined.Footnote 3 Since control comes in degrees it is hard to nail down the luck argument in full generality. One might maintain, for example, that indeterminism does not preclude the possibility of exercising any control over our actions, but instead diminishes our control so severely that we never freely perform any of these actions. Nonetheless, the core of this problem can be characterized by the following two claims:

This version of the luck argument has the most potential bite. If Hume and Hobart are correct that undetermined events are uncaused, then it does indeed seem that undetermined actions are a matter of luck. Thus we have premise (i) from above. Moreover, it is reasonable, from an intuitive standpoint, to assume that if an action is a matter luck, then it is not a free action. Therefore, libertarianism is incoherent: it entails that some unfree actions are also free actions.

On the first horn, in order to have freedom over any of our actions and thus to avoid luck, we must have always been performing actions. But this is not a tenable picture of agency. The origins of agency are certainly obscure, but we can be confident that none of our origins are similar to the agent in this story: we are finite agents and there was a time when we were not performing any actions, let alone free actions. Presumably there is some time (a moment or perhaps a segment of time) in our lives at which we perform an action(s) and there was no earlier time that we performed any action. It is hard to determine when the precise time is, but that need not concern us. The simple point is that it is necessarily false, at least for finite agents like us, that for every free action we perform, there was an earlier time that we performed an action (perhaps God is like this).

When unensured action is understood to refer to action over which we fail to (freely or merely) exercise antecedent control, (2) is problematic. Requiring mere antecedent control is unmotivated, and requiring free antecedent control makes freedom impossible for finite agents. But even supposing that this impossible condition is required, it is important to realize that indeterminism is not generating the problem: it is our finitude, not indeterminism that raises the specter of constitutive luck.

Explanatory formulations of the luck argument maintain that luck is introduced into the action-sequence due to the unavailability of a certain kind of explanation. It is because the feature that would allow us to give such an explanation is missing that the agent is subject to luck, and, of course, the presence of luck entails that the action in question is not free. Once again, it seems that libertarians are committed to the existence of actions that are both free and unfree.